26일 조지 W. 부시 대통령은 "선거에 영향을 주기 위해 누군가 고의로 유출했다"고 직접적으로 이 사건을 비난하고 나섰다. 이번 중간선거에서 이라크 전쟁에 대한 평가는 선거 결과를 좌우할 정도의 최대 쟁점으로 떠오르고 있기 때문이다.
그러나 그는 "비밀 문서를 해제하기는 싫지만, 이 보고서로 인해 혼란이 초래될 것이 우려된다"면서 30페이지에 달하는 전체 보고서 중 이라크 관련 부분 일부를 공개하도록 지시했다.
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이날 공개된 3페이지 분량의 발췌문은 <전세계 테러리즘 동향 : 미국에 대한 시사점>이라는 제목으로서, 백악관은 이와 관련해 "이라크 관련 사항 전부를 포함해 '핵심 정보판단' 부분 중 95%에 해당하는 것이며, 국가 안보 상 2~3개 구절만 편집된 것"이라고 밝혔다.
이 보고서의 주요 내용은 다음과 같다.
- 이라크 전쟁은 전세계 이슬람 전사들에게 '큰 반향을 일으킨 사건'으로 무슬림 세계에서 미국에 대한 깊은 적개감을 배양했다.
- 이라크에서 성전이 성공을 거두고 있는 것으로 인식되면서 다른 곳에서도 더 많은 전사들이 투쟁을 계속하도록 고취할 것이다.
- 무슬림 중 소수에 불과하지만 전사들의 수와 활동지역은 늘고 있다.
- 이런 추세가 계속되면, 전세계에 걸쳐 미국의 인명과 자산에 대한 위협이 확산되면서, 더 많은 공격을 받게 된다.
- 전사들은 유럽을 서구의 이해관계를 공격하는 주요 무대로 간주하고 있다.
이 보고서는 나아가 "미국이 주도한 테러와의 전쟁으로 알카에다의 지도부가 큰 타격을 받고 작전활동이 힘들 게 됐다"면서도 "그러나 알카에다는 단일 테러 조직으로서는 미국 본토와 해외에 있는 미국의 인명과 자산에 지속적으로 최대 위협이 될 것으로 판단한다"고 지적했다.
또한 이 보고서는 "지하드 확산을 촉진하고 있는 요인들이 취약점을 능가하고 있으며, 이번 보고서가 다루고 있는 평가 시기 동안 이러한 상황이 지속될 것"이라고 강조했다. 백악관에 따르면 이번 평가시기는 이 보고서가 제출된 지난 4월을 기점으로 최근 5년간이다.
보고서는 지하드 확산을 촉진하고 있는 4가지 요소로 '깊은 슬픔과 무력감', '이라크 지하드', '무슬림 국가들의 개혁 지체', '대부분의 무슬림들 사이에 만연된 반미감정'을 꼽았다.
<뉴욕타임스>에 따르면 이번 보고서는 부시 행정부 내 16개 정보기관의 합의를 바탕으로 작성된 것이다. 이 때문에 낸시 펠로시 민주당 하원 원내대표는 "이번 보고서로 인해 이라크에 대한 논쟁의 방향이 바뀔 것"이라며 "보고서 전체가 비밀 해제되어야 한다"고 기염을 토했다.
부시 대통령은 "미국 국민들에게 해를 끼치려는 사람들에 대해 공격하는 것이 우리의 안전을 더욱 취약하게 만들고 있다고 믿는 것은 실수라고 생각한다"고 반박했지만, 곤혹스러움을 감추지는 못했다.
다음은 공개된 발췌 보고서의 원문이다.
Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism : Implications for the United States" dated April 2006
Key Judgments
United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of
al-Qa'ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa'ida will continue to
pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist
organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes al-
Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is
spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.
• Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body
of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists,
although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and
geographic dispersion.
• If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become
more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.
• Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority
nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such
progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the
vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa'ida,
could erode support for the jihadists.
We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global
strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-
American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose
and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.
• We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in
importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the
Homeland.
• The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests.
Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate
recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and
2005 London bombings.
We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and
operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the
struggle elsewhere.
• The Iraq conflict has become the "cause celebre" for jihadists, breeding a deep
resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for
the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves,
and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry
on the fight.
We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its
vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.
• Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1)
Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western
domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the
Iraq "jihad;" (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and
political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US
sentiment among most Muslims—all of which jihadists exploit.
Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposed
and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement. They include
dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the
jihadists' radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and
criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.
• The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution—an
ultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based governance spanning the
Muslim world—is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the
religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda
would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.
• Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few
notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a
constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also
could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim
communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on
passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the
most powerful weapon in the war on terror.
• Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated
multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist
leaders.
If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years,
political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and
groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless,
attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities
for jihadists to exploit.
Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is exploiting the
situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.
• The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and
al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into
smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the
mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements.
We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less
serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa'ida.
• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against
Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global
threat.
• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa'ida in Iraq might
lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.
Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al-
Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their
reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their
traditional areas of operation.
• We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al-
Qa'ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests
abroad. The focus of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local regime
targets and regional or global ones.
We judge that most jihadist groups—both well-known and newly formed—will use
improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to
implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct
sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a
potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.
• CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups.
While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of
terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from being
exploited by terrorists.
Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical
ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt
terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more
quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of
surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to
pinpoint.
• We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to
communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial
support.
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